The formal logical system presented on this page (formal language $\mathcal{L}$, definitions, axioms, derivations of theorems, and model-theoretic proof of consistency) is an auxiliary logical verification specification designed to objectively verify and visualise—through (1) the typing of the formal language $\mathcal{L}$ (distinguishing the entity sort and the coordinate sort, and specifying sentential operators on formulas and axiom schemas), (2) the derivation of Theorems T1–T8 from Definitions D1–D5 and Axioms A1, A2, A4–A8, and (3) the construction of a model $\mathcal{M}$ simultaneously satisfying all definitions and axioms (proof of consistency)—that the system obtained by restating the main claims of Proof of a World as premises (axioms) and conclusions (theorems) in a formal language contains no “logical leaps”, “conflation of definitions”, or “smuggling in of tacit premises”. The individual steps of reasoning in the main text (for example, in section 5, the step from the discussion on EN p. 20 / JA pp. 45–46 to the conclusion on EN pp. 20–21 / JA p. 47) are not formalised and lie outside the scope of this page.
In referring to or critiquing this data, the following premises and methodology are shared.
All science and philosophy, too, aim at obtaining a completed logical (explanatory) model; that is to say, “a completely closed logic”. And such things as “objective facts” and “the established practices of science”, too, are, just like this book, handled in accordance with a “convenience”, on the basis of subjectivity. Therefore, the work that should properly be done in inquiry is not endless doubt that does not even amount to a refutation, but reaching a closed logic.
In this book, “proof” does not mean a mathematical or deductive proof in the narrow sense, one that uses formulae and technical terms. It means making clear and settling, in everyday words alone and within this closed logic, the “state” in which the existence of the individual and of the world holds firmly, leaving no question. That said, if one looks at the structure itself, in which only very plain and familiar concepts are laid down as a minimum of axioms (premises) and the argument is built without bringing in outside assumptions to derive the reality of the world and of the individual, the book follows, in the broad sense, the same procedure as a deductive proof based on an axiomatic system, and it stands, literally, as Proof of a World. Even if science were one day to unravel the mysteries of the universe by deductive means, the question “Is that really a fundamental explanation?” would remain; and this book conducts its inquiry at that stage.
Likewise, the objection that, in the development from sections 1 and 2 (the frames given by subjectivity, and the definition of sō-omou as the sense of “thinking so”) to section 3 (the hypothesis that “every being is sō-omou itself”), “there is a leap from epistemology to ontology” does not apply. For the very supposition or conjecture that “independent, objective matter may exist outside sō-omou” is, as shown in sections 1 and 3, one frame brought about by “the working of sō-omou (thinking so)”, and the matter supposed there, too, can be considered a being equal to sō-omou (consciousness). Therefore, the moment one stands on the premises of sections 1–3, there is, in principle, no divide of higher and lower, or of dominance and subordination, between “recognition (subjectivity)” and “external beings” (we and the world are equal beings). This book sets it out as a “hypothesis” in section 3, verifies in sections 4–6 that the questions of time and of nothingness can all be resolved without contradiction, and brings it back as the conclusion in the final section, thereby closing the argument without a leap.
On that basis, this book holds that, as long as it works as an explanation, there may be any number of answers. That fundamental premises cannot be refuted is equally true for those who demand a refutation. Whether to accept the premises and the argument is up to each individual; but merely raising doubts by cutting out parts of something that is closed as a single complete explanation does not amount to a refutation. The same goes for trying merely to apply existing definitions of time, being and so on from outside: it does not stand as a logical criticism. There are dishes made without fire, and there is no need to put pasta in curry and rice. Just as one cannot ride a bicycle while riding in a car, one should not apply elements of another system without questioning the falsifiability of one’s own premises.
That is to say, when examining a closed axiomatic system (logical model) such as this essay, the only logical task is to check “whether, when one stands at the entrance presented (the minimum of premises), it is closed without contradiction all the way to the exit”. To refuse to go in at the entrance and to attempt criticism by lining up unrelated elements or other yardsticks from outside is not an examination of the model in question; it merely amounts to “talking about something else from another system of premises”. In the first place, this essay is a logical structure built not for competing over rightness with others or for arguing anyone down, but for the purpose of “protecting the world (boundary) that each human being holds dear, and the existence of the individual, from the imposition of rightness and from nihility”. Therefore, to leave the main question, “whether this structure is complete as a mechanism that proves the reality of the individual and the world without contradiction and protects it to the end”, and to try to deny it by outside standards amounts to bringing in the rules of another system, and does not engage, as a critique, with the internal logic of this book.
To eliminate any conflation between “quantification in first-order predicate logic” and “operations on propositions (formulas)”, and to avoid confusing “beings (entities)” with “coordinates (locations)”, the sorts (types) and syntactic rules of the formal language $\mathcal{L}$ of this system are specified as follows.
Internal rules specifying the meaning of terms in the main text and appendix. Each symbol is defined only once. A defined symbol is an abbreviation and is read by replacing it with the right-hand side of its definition inside any formula (including inside sentential operators $\mathbf{S}, F, Truth$). Consequently, definitions add no new claims (formulas that add substantive claims are placed as axioms in Section III).
Every operation by which something is established as “being there”—such as understanding, conviction, recognition, or positing—is the establishment $\mathbf{S}$ of sō-omou (“thinking so”). In the fundamental domain not mediated by divisions of convenience, for $x$ to be sō-omou $S(x)$ is for “$x$ exists” to be established as sō-omou $\mathbf{S}(B(x))$.
Distinctions such as “subject and object”, “mind and matter”, “past, present, and future (chronology $F_{\text{time}}$)”, and “the boundary between self and other” are structural rules of division (conveniences $F$) set up within sō-omou (* this preamble explains the background in the main text; $F$ does not appear in the formulas D2a–D2e, and $F_{\text{time}}$ is not a formal symbol but a descriptive label for “the convenience called chronology”). On this basis, “fundamental exterior ($Ext_{\text{原理的}}$)”, “unilateral generation ($Gen$)”, “temporal boundaries ($Begin, End$)”, and “absolute nothingness ($\text{AbsoluteNothing}$)”—which are targets of refutation in this system—are defined by the following formulas. (* For D2a, only the non-self-referential unary form $\forall x \, (Ext_{\text{原理的}}(x) \iff \neg \mathbf{S}(B(x)))$ is adopted as the definition.)
A being that is established as sō-omou $S(x)$ and stands in symmetry of mutual establishment with others is defined as a “fundamental being ($PE$)”.
In the fundamental domain that does not presuppose chronology $F_{\text{time}}$, “simultaneous ($\text{CoPresent}$)”, “already present ($\text{AlreadyPresent}$)”, and “fundamentally identical ($\text{Same}$)” are defined by the following conjunctions:
Truth is the event itself in which sō-omou appears through the act of pursuit (D5a: definition schema for any formula), and meaning $M(x)$ is not something conferred by an external purpose, but existence $B(x)$ itself (D5b).
The axioms in the object language $\mathcal{L}$ of this system are the seven principles A1, A2 (axiom schemas) and A4, A5, A6, A7, A8 (where A8 is also an axiom schema). A3 is stated explicitly not as an axiom (formula) of the object language, but as a meta-theoretic restriction. These axioms are not deduced; they are the premises posited by this book (see Section VII, Q3).
For any formula $\phi$, whatever holds, necessarily holds through and within sō-omou $\mathbf{S}$.
Any framework of convenience $F(\phi)$, including “objective facts” and “matter”, does not lie outside sō-omou, but is established as an operation $\mathbf{S}(\phi)$ of sō-omou.
[Clarification of Status] Item A3 is not an axiom (formula) written inside the object language $\mathcal{L}$, but a meta-theoretic restriction when referring to or verifying this formal system from the outside. Accordingly, it adds no undefined predicates or sorts to the object language $\mathcal{L}$.
“The act of picturing an object” and “the act of being pictured by that object” are fundamentally equal; there is no one-way relation of subordination between the side that acts and the side acted upon.
Fundamentally, no chronology (sequence of distinct coordinates) exists. There is only one coordinate $c_0$, before-and-after relations hold only between distinct coordinates, and at $c_0$ there is the continuity $C(c_0, c_0)$ in which “the now keeps bringing about the now”.
$S_{\text{ind}}$ is an entity constant representing an individual’s personal sō-omou, and $y$ is a variable ranging over arbitrary beings. Because the personal sō-omou $S_{\text{ind}}$ and all beings $y$ are simultaneously co-present and operating at the single coordinate $c_0$, the world as a whole cannot be arbitrarily altered by a single individual’s sō-omou $S_{\text{ind}}$ alone.
Everything that is established as sō-omou is real.
Whatever proposition $\phi(x)$ about a being $x$ may be, if it is posited and appears as sō-omou $\mathbf{S}(\phi(x))$, then that being $x$ is established as sō-omou $S(x)$.
From Definitions D1–D5 and Axioms A1, A2, A4–A8 alone, without relying on natural-language supplementation, each theorem is derived without omission using only standard rules of inference of first-order predicate logic (Modus Ponens MP, introduction and elimination of conjunction, implication, and biconditional, proof by contradiction [reductio ad absurdum], contraposition, double negation elimination, transitivity, universal instantiation and generalisation, existential instantiation, quantifier negation exchange, reflexivity/symmetry/transitivity and substitution of equality, and expansion of definitions). (* The derivations are written out by hand, and every step can be verified directly by the inference rules listed above. They have also been checked mechanically with the proof assistant Lean 4 (see “Machine Verification in Lean 4” in Section 0).)
| Lemma / Theorem | Direct Basis | Logical Mechanism of Derivation and Established Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| L1 | A5 | Applies the first conjunct of A5, $\forall c \, (c = c_0)$, to the coordinate $Loc(x)$, deriving that every being is located at $c_0$. |
| T1 | A1, D2a | From $B(a) \implies \mathbf{S}(B(a))$ (A1) and $Ext_{\text{原理的}}(a) \implies \neg \mathbf{S}(B(a))$ (D2a), derives the contradiction $\mathbf{S}(B(a)) \land \neg \mathbf{S}(B(a))$ ($\bot$) under the assumption $B(a) \land Ext_{\text{原理的}}(a)$. |
| T2 | A1, D1, A7 | Obtains $B(x) \implies S(x)$ from A1 ($B(x) \implies \mathbf{S}(B(x))$) and D1, and $S(x) \implies B(x)$ from A7, deriving $\forall x (B(x) \iff S(x))$. |
| T3 | A4, D3, T2 (Corollary: L1, D4a, A6) |
$S(x) \iff PE(x)$ follows from A4 and D3 and combines with T2. Also derives $\text{Limited}(S_{\text{ind}})$ via L1, D4a, and A6. |
| T4 | A4, D2b | Combines D2b (defining $Gen$ as an asymmetric operation) with the symmetry axiom A4 to derive $\forall x (\neg Gen(x))$. |
| T5 | A5, L1, D2c, D2d | Because there is only the single coordinate $c_0$ and before-and-after relations hold only between distinct coordinates (A5), $\text{Before}(c_0, c_0)$ cannot hold, deriving $\neg Begin(x) \land \neg End(x)$. |
| T6 | A1, A8, A7, D2e | From the assumption $\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a)$, derives $B(a)$ via A1, A8, and A7, yielding a contradiction ($\bot$) with $\neg B(a)$ from D2e. Corollary: $\forall x \, B(x)$. |
| T7 | Cor. of T6, T3, L1, T4, D4b | From $B(x)$ (Cor. of T6), obtains $PE(x)$ (T3), $Loc(x) = c_0$ (L1), and $\neg Gen(x)$ (T4), deriving $\text{AlreadyPresent}(x)$ via D4b. |
| T8 | T2, T3, D5b (Cor. 1: Cor. of T6; Cor. 2: L1, D4c) |
Conjoins T2 ($S \iff B$), T3 ($B \iff PE$), and D5b ($B \iff M$). Derives $\forall x (S \land B \land PE \land M)$ in Corollary 1 and $\forall x \forall y \, \text{Same}(x, y)$ in Corollary 2. |
Independently of the derivations in Section IV, this section demonstrates that there exists a model $\mathcal{M}$ that simultaneously makes all 19 formulas of the definitions (D1, D2a, D2b, D2c, D2d, D2e, D3, D4a, D4b, D4c, D5a, D5b) and axioms (A1, A2, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8) of the object language $\mathcal{L}$ true, thereby proving the consistency of the system. (* A3 is a meta-theoretic restriction and not a formula of the object language.)
| No. | Object-Language Formula (Definition / Axiom) | Evaluation in Model ℳ |
|---|---|---|
| (1) D1 | $\forall x \, (S(x) \iff \mathbf{S}(B(x)))$ | LHS $S(x)$ is True. RHS $V_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathbf{S}(B(x))) = V_{\mathcal{M}}(B(x))$ is True. True. |
| (2) D2a | $\forall x \, (Ext_{\text{原理的}}(x) \iff \neg \mathbf{S}(B(x)))$ | LHS is False. RHS $\neg V_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathbf{S}(B(x))) = \neg\text{True} = \text{False}$. True. |
| (3) D2b | $\forall x \, (Gen(x) \iff \exists a \, (P(a, x) \land \neg P(x, a)))$ | LHS is False. Since $P$ is True for all pairs, no $a$ satisfies $P(a, x) \land \neg P(x, a)$, so RHS is False. True. |
| (4) D2c | $\forall x \, (Begin(x) \iff \exists c \, \text{Before}(c, Loc(x)))$ | LHS is False. Since $\text{Before}$ is empty, RHS is also False. True. |
| (5) D2d | $\forall x \, (End(x) \iff \exists c \, \text{Before}(Loc(x), c))$ | Likewise, both LHS and RHS are False. True. |
| (6) D2e | $\forall x \, (\text{AbsoluteNothing}(x) \iff \neg B(x))$ | LHS is False. RHS $\neg\text{True} = \text{False}$. True. |
| (7) D3 | $\forall x \, (PE(x) \iff (S(x) \land \forall y \, (P(x, y) \iff P(y, x))))$ | LHS is True. $S(x)$ is True and $P$ is symmetric, so RHS is also True. True. |
| (8) D4a | $\forall x \forall y \, (\text{CoPresent}(x, y) \iff (Loc(x) = c_0 \land Loc(y) = c_0))$ | LHS is True. $Loc(x) = k = I(c_0)$ and $Loc(y) = k$, so RHS is also True. True. |
| (9) D4b | $\forall x \, (\text{AlreadyPresent}(x) \iff (Loc(x) = c_0 \land PE(x) \land \neg Gen(x)))$ | LHS is True. RHS is $\text{True} \land \text{True} \land \neg\text{False} = \text{True}$. True. |
| (10) D4c | $\forall x \forall y \, (\text{Same}(x, y) \iff (PE(x) \land PE(y) \land Loc(x) = Loc(y)))$ | LHS is True. RHS is $\text{True} \land \text{True} \land \text{True}$ ($k = k$). True. |
| (11) D5a (Schema) | $Truth(\phi) \iff \mathbf{S}(\phi)$ | For any $\phi$, $V_{\mathcal{M}}(Truth(\phi)) = V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi) = V_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathbf{S}(\phi))$. Always True. |
| (12) D5b | $\forall x \, (M(x) \iff B(x))$ | Both LHS and RHS are True. True. |
| (13) A1 (Schema) | $\phi \implies \mathbf{S}(\phi)$ | For any $\phi$, $(V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi) \implies V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi))$. Always True. |
| (14) A2 (Schema) | $F(\phi) \implies \mathbf{S}(\phi)$ | For any $\phi$, $(V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi) \implies V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi))$. Always True. |
| (15) A4 | $\forall x \forall y \, (P(x, y) \iff P(y, x))$ | Since $P$ is True for all pairs, it is symmetric. True. |
| (16) A5 | $\forall c \, (c = c_0) \land \forall c \, \forall c' \, (\text{Before}(c, c') \implies c \neq c') \land C(c_0, c_0)$ | Since $D_C = \{k\}$, the 1st conjunct is True. Since $\text{Before}$ is empty, the 2nd conjunct is True. $C(k, k)$ is True. True. |
| (17) A6 | $(\forall y \, \text{CoPresent}(S_{\text{ind}}, y)) \implies \text{Limited}(S_{\text{ind}})$ | Antecedent $\forall y \, \text{CoPresent}(s, y)$ is True, and consequent $\text{Limited}(s)$ is True. True. |
| (18) A7 | $\forall x \, (S(x) \implies B(x))$ | Both antecedent and consequent are True. True. |
| (19) A8 (Schema) | $\forall x \, (\mathbf{S}(\phi(x)) \implies S(x))$ | Since the consequent $S(x)$ is True for every $x$, it is True for any formula $\phi(x)$. |
From the above, the present system is consistent, and T1–T8 are derived from its definitions and axioms. Note, however, that this does not show that the premises (axioms) themselves are true (see Section 0, “Two-Layer Structure of Proof”). $\blacksquare$
[Answer]
There is no circularity in the formal structure. T2 is derived from A1, D1, and A7, and no step uses the conclusion T2 as a premise. The claim connecting recognition and existence is stated explicitly on the side of the premises A1, A7, and A8, which correspond to what Section 3 of the book sets out as its “hypothesis” (the book verifies in Sections 4–6 that this hypothesis does not contradict questions of time and nothingness, and takes it as the conclusion in the Final Section). What T1 shows is that, under these premises, the assumption that “an independent domain of existence lies outside sō-omou (recognition)” cannot hold. Moreover, the claim that “the act of recognition” and “the object in itself (thing-in-itself)” must be separated itself rests on a different premise (Kantian or modern subject-object dualism). Furthermore, sō-omou in this book is not a “subjective mental image inside the brain (an illusion)”, but the principle of reality that includes objects (matter and body) and recognition on an equal footing (T3), so the reality of matter is in no way impaired.
[Answer]
There is no contradiction. “Being one at a single coordinate” means that there is only one coordinate (A5) and that all beings are fundamentally identical (D4c, Corollary 2 of T8); it does not mean that everything is numerically a single individual. The individual, the other, and the world can each exist simultaneously as distinct real beings at the same single coordinate point $c_0$ (Model $\mathcal{M}$ in Section VI is an example). A “convenience $F$” does not mean a “worthless illusion”, but a structural division by which the whole at the single coordinate $c_0$ is concretely established as human beings and individual worlds. And by T3 and T8, the individual world in which each person lives (the domain of joy and attachment shaped by conveniences) is also affirmed as a “fundamental being (reality)” on an equal footing with the laws of physics and the universe as a whole. Precisely because there is no hierarchy of superiority or inferiority among beings (one cannot negate a lower subjectivity from a higher objective truth), the act of trampling upon and negating another’s boundary by an external yardstick is logically unjustified.
[Answer]
That is correct. In addition to A4 and D5b, A1, A7, and A8 connecting existence and sō-omou, as well as A5 on the single coordinate, are premises posited by this book. No system of mathematics or logic can generate theorems out of nothing; every system sets down “axioms” and “definitions” that determine its character as its starting point. Whereas conventional philosophy has tacitly adopted “the asymmetry of subject and object (dualism)” or “the separation of existence and meaning” as premises, this book selects “mutual establishment (A4)” and “existence = meaning (D5b)” as explicit premises and exhibits a system that closes without contradiction from them. What this data demonstrates is that the conclusions are derived without contradiction from these premises, not that the premises themselves are true.
[Answer]
It “appears as though newly born” because human beings grasp phenomena through the frame of chronological convenience ($F_{\text{time}}$: the flow from past to future). At the fundamental coordinate $c_0$, there is no unilateral generation ($Gen$) (T4). Insofar as a relation of establishment holds between a concept $x$—which is included in the overall structure from the start—and a human being $a$, it is necessarily mutual establishment ($P(a, x) \iff P(x, a)$, A4), appearing within the continuity $C(c_0, c_0)$. This has the same structure as the position in mathematics that “new theorems are not invented, but rather theorems that were present in logical space from the start are discovered”.
[Answer]
In this system, absolute nothingness is defined as non-reality (D2e), so “real absolute nothingness” cannot hold by definition. And “absolute nothingness that is neither thought nor recognised”—that is, an $a$ for which $\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a)$ holds while $\mathbf{S}(\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a))$ does not hold—is ruled out by A1 (whatever holds, also holds as “thinking so”). Furthermore, by T6, there is no being corresponding to absolute nothingness at all. Note, however, that because classical first-order logic used by this system presupposes from the outset that something exists (that the domain is non-empty), the state of “nothing existing whatsoever” cannot be expressed in this system in the first place. What T6 shows is up to “no being in the domain is absolute nothingness”, which corresponds to p. 21 of the English edition (p. 49 of the Japanese edition): “there is no longer any need to admit even ‘a beginning’, let alone ‘nothingness’”. Moreover, the strength of this conclusion rests on the premises A1 and A8.
[Answer]
No hierarchy arises. Being distinct means being numerically distinguished, which involves no hierarchical ordering. Hierarchy or subordination arises only when there is a relation that holds in one direction alone (subordination or unilateral generation); in this system, however, the relation of picturing is symmetric (A4), there is no unilateral generation (T4), co-presence is symmetric (D4a), all beings are fundamental beings and meanings on an equal footing (Corollary 1 of T8), and all beings are fundamentally identical (Corollary 2 of T8). A coordinate is not one of the beings but a distinct sort representing the location of beings, so there is no hierarchy between coordinates and beings either. While being fundamentally identical, distinct real beings can exist simultaneously at one and the same coordinate point (Model $\mathcal{M}$ in Section VI)—this is the world depicted by the present system.