Formal Verification of Internal Consistency and Deductive Structure — Proof of a World
(『世界の証明』形式論理による内部整合性・演繹構造の検証データ / Rev. 5, 19 November 2026)

Author: Ryuto Sako (酒勾龍渡) | Auxiliary Formal Logic Verification Data (English Edition / Rev. 5)
• Target Work: Proof of a World (『世界の証明』)
• Author: Ryuto Sako (酒勾龍渡)
• National Diet Library (NDL) Authority ID: 032264173
• ISBN: 978-4-9912331-0-4
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23607369
• ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-5501-8426
• VIAF: http://viaf.org/viaf/26165867632464002694
• Wikidata: https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q141911037
• Record of this data (formal model Rev. 5 and its machine verification in Lean 4), Zenodo DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24368376
■ About the Creation of This Data (Use of AI)
  • Every word of the main text of Proof of a World (『世界の証明』, published in May 2022, with the original archived at the National Diet Library of Japan on publication) was written by the author himself, and its argument was complete, in the author’s own words, at that time. The formalisation in this document was made from that argument.
  • The formalisation in this document (formal language, definitions, axioms, derivations, model, and FAQ) was produced by Gemini (Google) and Claude (Anthropic) at the author’s direction and inspected by multiple AI systems.
  • The English text of this page was translated from the Japanese by Gemini (Google). The section “On the Premises of the Essay, the Definition of Proof, and Methodology” uses the translation in the English edition of the book, which was made with the help of Claude (Anthropic) and checked by the author against the Japanese.
  • The author is not a specialist in mathematical logic. The correspondence with the content of the book is shown through the [Reading] (in plain language) attached to each formula and the page references to the main text.
  • The file for the machine verification in Lean 4 (ProofOfAWorld_Rev5.lean) was written by Claude (Anthropic) at the author’s request (19 November 2026). Its correctness rests not on trust in the writer but on Lean’s check.
  • The validity of the formulas rests not on inspection by AI, but on the derivations in Section IV (where every step can be checked by standard rules of inference) and the model in Section VI (which anyone can verify by direct evaluation). Both have also been checked mechanically in Lean 4 (see “Machine Verification in Lean 4” in Section 0).

0. Purpose and Position of This Data (Prerequisites Before Reference)

The formal logical system presented on this page (formal language $\mathcal{L}$, definitions, axioms, derivations of theorems, and model-theoretic proof of consistency) is an auxiliary logical verification specification designed to objectively verify and visualise—through (1) the typing of the formal language $\mathcal{L}$ (distinguishing the entity sort and the coordinate sort, and specifying sentential operators on formulas and axiom schemas), (2) the derivation of Theorems T1–T8 from Definitions D1–D5 and Axioms A1, A2, A4–A8, and (3) the construction of a model $\mathcal{M}$ simultaneously satisfying all definitions and axioms (proof of consistency)—that the system obtained by restating the main claims of Proof of a World as premises (axioms) and conclusions (theorems) in a formal language contains no “logical leaps”, “conflation of definitions”, or “smuggling in of tacit premises”. The individual steps of reasoning in the main text (for example, in section 5, the step from the discussion on EN p. 20 / JA pp. 45–46 to the conclusion on EN pp. 20–21 / JA p. 47) are not formalised and lie outside the scope of this page.
In referring to or critiquing this data, the following premises and methodology are shared.

■ On the Premises of the Essay, the Definition of Proof, and Methodology
(Identical to the section of the same title in the Appendix of the Complete Edition, EN pp. 30–31 / JA pp. 68–69)

All science and philosophy, too, aim at obtaining a completed logical (explanatory) model; that is to say, “a completely closed logic”. And such things as “objective facts” and “the established practices of science”, too, are, just like this book, handled in accordance with a “convenience”, on the basis of subjectivity. Therefore, the work that should properly be done in inquiry is not endless doubt that does not even amount to a refutation, but reaching a closed logic.

In this book, “proof” does not mean a mathematical or deductive proof in the narrow sense, one that uses formulae and technical terms. It means making clear and settling, in everyday words alone and within this closed logic, the “state” in which the existence of the individual and of the world holds firmly, leaving no question. That said, if one looks at the structure itself, in which only very plain and familiar concepts are laid down as a minimum of axioms (premises) and the argument is built without bringing in outside assumptions to derive the reality of the world and of the individual, the book follows, in the broad sense, the same procedure as a deductive proof based on an axiomatic system, and it stands, literally, as Proof of a World. Even if science were one day to unravel the mysteries of the universe by deductive means, the question “Is that really a fundamental explanation?” would remain; and this book conducts its inquiry at that stage.

Likewise, the objection that, in the development from sections 1 and 2 (the frames given by subjectivity, and the definition of sō-omou as the sense of “thinking so”) to section 3 (the hypothesis that “every being is sō-omou itself”), “there is a leap from epistemology to ontology” does not apply. For the very supposition or conjecture that “independent, objective matter may exist outside sō-omou” is, as shown in sections 1 and 3, one frame brought about by “the working of sō-omou (thinking so)”, and the matter supposed there, too, can be considered a being equal to sō-omou (consciousness). Therefore, the moment one stands on the premises of sections 1–3, there is, in principle, no divide of higher and lower, or of dominance and subordination, between “recognition (subjectivity)” and “external beings” (we and the world are equal beings). This book sets it out as a “hypothesis” in section 3, verifies in sections 4–6 that the questions of time and of nothingness can all be resolved without contradiction, and brings it back as the conclusion in the final section, thereby closing the argument without a leap.

On that basis, this book holds that, as long as it works as an explanation, there may be any number of answers. That fundamental premises cannot be refuted is equally true for those who demand a refutation. Whether to accept the premises and the argument is up to each individual; but merely raising doubts by cutting out parts of something that is closed as a single complete explanation does not amount to a refutation. The same goes for trying merely to apply existing definitions of time, being and so on from outside: it does not stand as a logical criticism. There are dishes made without fire, and there is no need to put pasta in curry and rice. Just as one cannot ride a bicycle while riding in a car, one should not apply elements of another system without questioning the falsifiability of one’s own premises.

That is to say, when examining a closed axiomatic system (logical model) such as this essay, the only logical task is to check “whether, when one stands at the entrance presented (the minimum of premises), it is closed without contradiction all the way to the exit”. To refuse to go in at the entrance and to attempt criticism by lining up unrelated elements or other yardsticks from outside is not an examination of the model in question; it merely amounts to “talking about something else from another system of premises”. In the first place, this essay is a logical structure built not for competing over rightness with others or for arguing anyone down, but for the purpose of “protecting the world (boundary) that each human being holds dear, and the existence of the individual, from the imposition of rightness and from nihility”. Therefore, to leave the main question, “whether this structure is complete as a mechanism that proves the reality of the individual and the world without contradiction and protects it to the end”, and to try to deny it by outside standards amounts to bringing in the rules of another system, and does not engage, as a critique, with the internal logic of this book.

■ Three Disclaimers on the Scope of These Formulas and the Two-Layer Structure of Proof

1. Not Intended to Reduce the World to Mathematical Formulas The essence of this book lies in protecting the reality of individuals and the world, and their boundaries, through plain everyday language; it is not claimed that the formulas on this page “explain everything in the world as mathematical formulas in themselves”. They are strictly an auxiliary tool for checking, after the main claims of the book have been restated as premises and conclusions, that the conclusions follow from the premises without contradiction; they do not check each individual step of the natural-language reasoning in the main text.
2. No External Premises (Subject-Object Dualism or Linear Time Models) Are Posited Although this model uses standard (classical) first-order logic extended with the sentential operators $\mathbf{S}$, $F$ and $Truth$ (treated as described in Section I [1] (4)), external premises such as “objective individuals exist in advance outside recognition” or “time is a before-and-after ordering on a number line” are not posited as axioms. Only definitions and axioms reflecting the internal rules of this book (the framing of conveniences, the foundational nature of sō-omou, the symmetry of mutual establishment, and continuity at a single coordinate) are posited.
3. Scope of Verification (Distinction Between (1) Derivability of Theorems and (2) Consistency of the Axiom System) Because “the derivability of Theorems T1–T8” and “the consistency of the axiom system” are distinct proof tasks in mathematical logic, this specification demonstrates the following two points separately:
  • Verification Target (1): Derivability of T1–T8 (Syntactic Derivability)
    In Section IV, within the typed formal language $\mathcal{L}$, each theorem is derived from Definitions D1–D5 and Axioms (including schemas) A1, A2, A4–A8 using rules of inference alone ($\text{D1–D5}, \text{A1, A2, A4–A8} \vdash \text{T1–T8}$).
  • Verification Target (2): Consistency of the Axiom System (Semantic Consistency)
    In Section VI, a model $\mathcal{M}$ that simultaneously makes all 19 formulas of the definitions and axioms true is constructed and verified ($\mathcal{M} \models \text{D1–D5} \cup \{\text{A1, A2, A4–A8}\} \implies \text{Consistent}$).

■ Two-Layer Structure of Proof

As stated in the section above, “proof” in this book is a broad proof in everyday words, and this data does not replace it with a narrow mathematical proof. What this data shows is that, for the system in which the argument of the book is reconstructed in a formal language, the following two points hold in the narrow sense (in the sense of mathematical logic):
  • Theorems T1–T8 are derived from the definitions and axioms (Section IV).
  • Those definitions and axioms do not contradict one another (Section VI).
It does not show that the premises (axioms) themselves are true.

■ Machine Verification in Lean 4

The two points above (the derivations in Section IV and the model in Section VI) have also been checked mechanically with the proof assistant Lean 4.
  • What was checked: (1) that Lemma L1 and Theorems T1–T8 with their corollaries are derivable from Definitions D1–D5 and Axioms A1, A2, A4–A8, in a general form that holds for any number of beings; (2) that the model ℳ of Section VI satisfies all 19 formulas of the definitions and axioms (consistency); (3) that the definitions and axioms do not force all beings to be numerically one (non-triviality; in ℳ the individual and the world are distinct).
  • Result (19 November 2026, Lean v4.36.0, Lean Web): no errors, no warnings, and no unproved steps (sorry). Lean’s report of what each result depends on (#print axioms) shows that no result uses any premise beyond the definitions and axioms, except the version of the corollary of T6 derived as in the text (by double-negation elimination), which uses the standard axioms of classical logic (propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound). The same corollary is also derived by a route that does not use double-negation elimination (the note to A8).
  • Notes on the encoding: the schemas (A1, A2, A8, D5a) are written in Lean as single statements about all propositions, which is slightly stronger than a schema. The derivations use only instances expressible in the language ℒ, and the model ℳ satisfies even the stronger form, so both conclusions also hold for the schemas. A3, a meta-theoretic restriction, is not written in Lean.
  • Scope: Lean checks only what lies inside the formal system (derivability and consistency). Whether the formulas faithfully represent the book, and whether the premises (axioms) are true, lie outside its scope.
  • Record (DOI): this formal model (Rev. 5) and its machine verification in Lean 4 are archived on Zenodo, together with the document in Japanese and in English (PDF) and the Lean file (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24368376).
  • File and how to re-run the check: ProofOfAWorld_Rev5.lean (view on GitHub). Opening Re-run the check on Lean Web loads this file into the official browser version of Lean, so that anyone can repeat the same check. The full Lean code and how to re-run the check are also on the page “Machine Verification in Lean 4”.

■ About the Creation of This Data (Use of AI)

  • Every word of the main text of Proof of a World (『世界の証明』, published in May 2022, with the original archived at the National Diet Library of Japan on publication) was written by the author himself, and its argument was complete, in the author’s own words, at that time. The formalisation in this document was made from that argument.
  • The formalisation in this document (formal language, definitions, axioms, derivations, model, and FAQ) was produced by Gemini (Google) and Claude (Anthropic) at the author’s direction and inspected by multiple AI systems.
  • The English text of this page was translated from the Japanese by Gemini (Google). The section “On the Premises of the Essay, the Definition of Proof, and Methodology” uses the translation in the English edition of the book, which was made with the help of Claude (Anthropic) and checked by the author against the Japanese.
  • The author is not a specialist in mathematical logic. The correspondence with the content of the book is shown through the [Reading] (in plain language) attached to each formula and the page references to the main text.
  • The file for the machine verification in Lean 4 (ProofOfAWorld_Rev5.lean) was written by Claude (Anthropic) at the author’s request (19 November 2026). Its correctness rests not on trust in the writer but on Lean’s check.
  • The validity of the formulas rests not on inspection by AI, but on the derivations in Section IV (where every step can be checked by standard rules of inference) and the model in Section VI (which anyone can verify by direct evaluation). Both have also been checked mechanically in Lean 4 (see “Machine Verification in Lean 4” in Section 0).

I. Typing of Formal Language ℒ (Entity Sort, Coordinate Sort, and Sentential Operators) & Primitives

To eliminate any conflation between “quantification in first-order predicate logic” and “operations on propositions (formulas)”, and to avoid confusing “beings (entities)” with “coordinates (locations)”, the sorts (types) and syntactic rules of the formal language $\mathcal{L}$ of this system are specified as follows.

[1. Typing of Formal Language ℒ]

  1. Entity Sort ($\text{Ent}$):
    The set of terms belonging to the domain of beings (individuals) $D_E$ over which quantifiers ($\forall, \exists$) range.
    • Entity variables: $x, y, a$
    • Entity constants: $S_{\text{ind}}$ (the individual’s personal sō-omou), $World$ (the world as a whole)
  2. Coordinate Sort ($\text{Crd}$):
    The set of terms belonging to the domain of coordinates (locations) $D_C$ over which quantifiers range. A coordinate is not one of the beings, but a distinct sort representing the “location” of beings (Main Text, EN p. 21 / JA p. 47: “To use coordinates as an analogy, it is easy to imagine if we think of every phenomenon as unfolding at one and the same coordinate point”).
    • Coordinate variables: $c, c'$
    • Coordinate constant: $c_0$ (the single fundamental coordinate)
    • Function symbol: $Loc: \text{Ent} \to \text{Crd}$ (returns the coordinate $Loc(t)$ at which an entity $t$ is located)
  3. Predicate Symbols:
    • 1-place predicates on entities: $S, B, PE, Concept, M, Ext_{\text{原理的}}, Gen, Begin, End, \text{AlreadyPresent}, \text{AbsoluteNothing}, \text{Limited}$
      (* Note: $Ext_{\text{原理的}}(x)$ denotes “being in the fundamental exterior of sō-omou”; the subscript “原理的” [genriteki = fundamental] is retained identical to the Japanese specification so that all 19 symbolic formulas match character-for-character across both editions.)
    • 2-place predicates on entities: $P(t_1, t_2), \text{CoPresent}(t_1, t_2), \text{Same}(t_1, t_2)$
    • 2-place predicates on coordinates: $C(c_1, c_2)$ (continuity), $\text{Before}(c_1, c_2)$ (chronological precedence)
    • Equality: $t_1 = t_2$ between entities, and between coordinates
  4. Well-Formed Formulas ($\text{WFF}_{\mathcal{L}}$) and Sentential Operators:
    The set of formulas inductively constructed from atomic formulas via logical connectives ($\neg, \land, \lor, \implies, \iff$), quantification over entity and coordinate variables ($\forall, \exists$), and sentential operators $\mathbf{S}(\phi), F(\phi), Truth(\phi)$ (where $\phi \in \text{WFF}_{\mathcal{L}}$).
    • Propositions (formulas) themselves are not quantified over (propositions are not elements of a domain, nor do they form a sort). Rules containing $\phi$ (A1, A2, A8, D5a) are “axiom schemas” in which each instance obtained by substituting an arbitrary formula $\phi$ is an axiom (in A8, $\phi(x)$ is an arbitrary formula containing $x$ as a free variable).
    • Treatment of the sentential operators: for each formula $\phi$, $\mathbf{S}(\phi)$, $F(\phi)$ and $Truth(\phi)$ are each treated as a single predicate whose arguments are the free variables of $\phi$ (for example, $\mathbf{S}(B(x))$ is a one-place predicate of $x$). The system is therefore an ordinary (many-sorted) first-order language, and the Soundness Theorem applies as it stands. Inside a sentential operator, a formula is never replaced by a different, logically equivalent formula (expanding a defined symbol into its definition is allowed, since it rewrites the same formula).
[Mini-Guide to Logical Symbols for Human Readers (Legend)]
∀xFor all x (universal)
∃xThere exists an x (existential)
A ⇒ BIf A then B (implication)
A ⇔ BA and B are equivalent (biconditional)
A ∧ BA and B (conjunction)
¬ANot A (negation)
⊢ PProposition P is derived from axioms & definitions
⊥ / ∎⊥ = contradiction, ∎ = end of derivation (Q.E.D.)

[2. List of Primitive Symbols and Vocabulary]

𝐒(φ)
[Sentential Operator] Formula φ is established and appears as “thinking so (sō-omou / 観念)”
[LaTeX] $\mathbf{S}(\phi)$
F(φ)
[Sentential Operator] φ is a convenience (secondary framework) set up within sō-omou
[LaTeX] $F(\phi)$
Truth(φ)
[Sentential Operator] φ appears as truth (defined in D5a)
[LaTeX] $Truth(\phi)$
S(x)
Entity x is sō-omou (観念) (defined in D1)
[LaTeX] $S(x)$
B(x)
Entity x exists (is real)
[LaTeX] $B(x)$
PE(x)
x is a fundamental being (原理的存在) (defined in D3)
[LaTeX] $PE(x)$
Concept(x)
x is a concept (an object that is pictured)
[LaTeX] $Concept(x)$
M(x)
x is meaning (has meaning) (defined in D5b)
[LaTeX] $M(x)$
P(x, y)
x pictures y (acts as sō-omou and establishes it)
[LaTeX] $P(x, y)$
Same(x, y)
x and y are fundamentally the same being (defined in D4c; distinct from numerical identity x = y)
[LaTeX] $\text{Same}(x, y)$
Sind, World
Sind: an individual’s personal sō-omou (entity constant) / World: the world as a whole (entity constant)
[LaTeX] $S_{\text{ind}}, World$
c₀
The single fundamental coordinate (coordinate constant)
[LaTeX] $c_0$
Loc(x)
The coordinate at which entity x is located
[LaTeX] $Loc(x)$
C(c₀, c₀)
Non-temporal continuity in which “the now keeps bringing about the now” at the single coordinate c₀
[LaTeX] $C(c_0, c_0)$
Before(c, c')
Coordinate c is before coordinate c' (chronological precedence)
[LaTeX] $\text{Before}(c, c')$

II. Definitions (D1–D5)

Internal rules specifying the meaning of terms in the main text and appendix. Each symbol is defined only once. A defined symbol is an abbreviation and is read by replacing it with the right-hand side of its definition inside any formula (including inside sentential operators $\mathbf{S}, F, Truth$). Consequently, definitions add no new claims (formulas that add substantive claims are placed as axioms in Section III).

D1 (Definition of sō-omou / 観念) Main Text, Sec. 2, p. 18 & Sec. 3, p. 19 [JA ed.: Ch. 2, pp. 37–38 & Ch. 3, p. 40]

Every operation by which something is established as “being there”—such as understanding, conviction, recognition, or positing—is the establishment $\mathbf{S}$ of sō-omou (“thinking so”). In the fundamental domain not mediated by divisions of convenience, for $x$ to be sō-omou $S(x)$ is for “$x$ exists” to be established as sō-omou $\mathbf{S}(B(x))$.

D1 :  ∀x  ( S(x) ⇔ 𝐒(B(x)) )
[Reading] For $x$ to be sō-omou is equivalent to “$x$ exists” being established as sō-omou.
[LaTeX] $$\text{D1}: \quad \forall x \, (S(x) \iff \mathbf{S}(B(x)))$$
D2 (Definitions of Frameworks of Convenience, Exterior, Unilateral Generation, and Boundaries) Main Text, Sec. 1, pp. 16–17; Sec. 5, p. 20; Sec. 6, p. 21; Final Sec., p. 22; Preface; Poem “Boundary” [JA ed.: pp. 32–34, 45, 49, 52]

Distinctions such as “subject and object”, “mind and matter”, “past, present, and future (chronology $F_{\text{time}}$)”, and “the boundary between self and other” are structural rules of division (conveniences $F$) set up within sō-omou (* this preamble explains the background in the main text; $F$ does not appear in the formulas D2a–D2e, and $F_{\text{time}}$ is not a formal symbol but a descriptive label for “the convenience called chronology”). On this basis, “fundamental exterior ($Ext_{\text{原理的}}$)”, “unilateral generation ($Gen$)”, “temporal boundaries ($Begin, End$)”, and “absolute nothingness ($\text{AbsoluteNothing}$)”—which are targets of refutation in this system—are defined by the following formulas. (* For D2a, only the non-self-referential unary form $\forall x \, (Ext_{\text{原理的}}(x) \iff \neg \mathbf{S}(B(x)))$ is adopted as the definition.)

D2a :  ∀x  ( Ext原理的(x) ⇔ ¬𝐒(B(x)) )
D2b :  ∀x  ( Gen(x) ⇔ ∃a ( P(a, x) ∧ ¬P(x, a) ) )
D2c :  ∀x  ( Begin(x) ⇔ ∃c  Before(c, Loc(x)) )
D2d :  ∀x  ( End(x) ⇔ ∃c  Before(Loc(x), c) )
D2e :  ∀x  ( AbsoluteNothing(x) ⇔ ¬B(x) )
[Reading] D2a: For $x$ to lie in the “fundamental exterior” of sō-omou is for the existence of $x$ not to be established as sō-omou $\mathbf{S}(B(x))$. D2b: Unilateral generation $Gen(x)$ means being pictured and brought about asymmetrically from some $a$ to $x$ without bidirectionality (a chronological relation of subordination; Main Text, EN p. 20 / JA p. 45). D2c: For $x$ to have a beginning is for there to be a coordinate before the coordinate of $x$. D2d: For $x$ to have an end is for there to be a coordinate after the coordinate of $x$. D2e: For $x$ to be absolute nothingness is for $x$ not to be real ($\neg B(x)$).
[LaTeX] $$\text{D2a}: \quad \forall x \, \left(Ext_{\text{原理的}}(x) \iff \neg \mathbf{S}(B(x))\right)$$ $$\text{D2b}: \quad \forall x \, \left(Gen(x) \iff \exists a \, (P(a, x) \land \neg P(x, a))\right)$$ $$\text{D2c}: \quad \forall x \, \left(Begin(x) \iff \exists c \, \text{Before}(c, Loc(x))\right)$$ $$\text{D2d}: \quad \forall x \, \left(End(x) \iff \exists c \, \text{Before}(Loc(x), c)\right)$$ $$\text{D2e}: \quad \forall x \, \left(\text{AbsoluteNothing}(x) \iff \neg B(x)\right)$$
D3 (Definition of Fundamental Being / 原理的存在) Main Text, Sec. 3, p. 19; Final Sec., p. 22; Appendix “Important Points” [JA ed.: Ch. 3, p. 40; Final Ch., p. 53]

A being that is established as sō-omou $S(x)$ and stands in symmetry of mutual establishment with others is defined as a “fundamental being ($PE$)”.

D3 :  ∀x  ( PE(x) ⇔ ( S(x) ∧ ∀y ( P(x, y) ⇔ P(y, x) ) ) )
[Reading] A fundamental being is one that is established as sō-omou and has no merely one-way relation of establishment with any being $y$ (whenever a relation of establishment holds, it is necessarily bidirectional).
[LaTeX] $$\text{D3}: \quad \forall x \, \left(PE(x) \iff (S(x) \land \forall y \, (P(x, y) \iff P(y, x)))\right)$$
D4 (Non-Temporal Definitions of Co-Presence, Already-Present, and Fundamental Identity) Main Text, Sec. 5, pp. 20–21; Sec. 6, pp. 21–22; Appendix [JA ed.: Ch. 5, pp. 45–47; Ch. 6, pp. 49–51]

In the fundamental domain that does not presuppose chronology $F_{\text{time}}$, “simultaneous ($\text{CoPresent}$)”, “already present ($\text{AlreadyPresent}$)”, and “fundamentally identical ($\text{Same}$)” are defined by the following conjunctions:

D4a :  ∀x ∀y  ( CoPresent(x, y) ⇔ ( Loc(x) = c₀ ∧ Loc(y) = c₀ ) )
D4b :  ∀x  ( AlreadyPresent(x) ⇔ ( Loc(x) = c₀ ∧ PE(x) ∧ ¬Gen(x) ) )
D4c :  ∀x ∀y  ( Same(x, y) ⇔ ( PE(x) ∧ PE(y) ∧ Loc(x) = Loc(y) ) )
[Reading] D4a: For $x$ and $y$ to be co-present (simultaneous) is for both to be located at the single coordinate $c_0$. D4b: To be already present is to exist at the single coordinate $c_0$ as a fundamental being without unilateral generation. D4c: For $x$ and $y$ to be fundamentally the same being is for both to be fundamental beings located at the same coordinate (Main Text, EN p. 20 / JA p. 46: “fundamentally they are one and the same being”). This is not numerical identity ($x = y$): $x$ and $y$ can be fundamentally identical while being distinct real beings.
[LaTeX] $$\text{D4a}: \quad \forall x \forall y \, \left(\text{CoPresent}(x, y) \iff (Loc(x) = c_0 \land Loc(y) = c_0)\right)$$ $$\text{D4b}: \quad \forall x \, \left(\text{AlreadyPresent}(x) \iff (Loc(x) = c_0 \land PE(x) \land \neg Gen(x))\right)$$ $$\text{D4c}: \quad \forall x \forall y \, \left(\text{Same}(x, y) \iff (PE(x) \land PE(y) \land Loc(x) = Loc(y))\right)$$
D5 (Definitions of Truth and Meaning) Preface & Final Sec., p. 22 [JA ed.: pp. 53–54]

Truth is the event itself in which sō-omou appears through the act of pursuit (D5a: definition schema for any formula), and meaning $M(x)$ is not something conferred by an external purpose, but existence $B(x)$ itself (D5b).

D5a (Schema) :  Truth(φ) ⇔ 𝐒(φ)
D5b :  ∀x  ( M(x) ⇔ B(x) )
[Reading] D5a: Truth is the event itself that appears as sō-omou. D5b: Having meaning ($M$) and existing ($B$) are equivalent. (* D5a is not used in the derivations of T1–T8; it is a definition for situating the book’s view of truth within the formal language.)
[LaTeX] $$\text{D5a (Schema)}: \quad Truth(\phi) \iff \mathbf{S}(\phi)$$ $$\text{D5b}: \quad \forall x \, (M(x) \iff B(x))$$

III. Axioms (A1, A2, A4–A8 & Meta-Theoretic Restriction A3)

The axioms in the object language $\mathcal{L}$ of this system are the seven principles A1, A2 (axiom schemas) and A4, A5, A6, A7, A8 (where A8 is also an axiom schema). A3 is stated explicitly not as an axiom (formula) of the object language, but as a meta-theoretic restriction. These axioms are not deduced; they are the premises posited by this book (see Section VII, Q3).

A1 (Axiom Schema of Sō-omou Subsumption) Main Text, Sec. 1, pp. 16–17 & Sec. 3, pp. 18–19 [JA ed.: Ch. 1, pp. 32–33 & Ch. 3, pp. 39–40]

For any formula $\phi$, whatever holds, necessarily holds through and within sō-omou $\mathbf{S}$.

A1 (Schema) :  φ ⇒ 𝐒(φ)
[Reading] For any formula $\phi$, if $\phi$ holds, then it holds as sō-omou $\mathbf{S}(\phi)$. (* The antecedent is “$\phi$ holds”, not “$\phi$ is asserted”. Together with A7 and A8, A1 is a strong premise formalising what Section 3 of the book posits as its “hypothesis” [that every being is sō-omou itself], and the weight of the system’s conclusions rests here.)
[LaTeX] $$\text{A1 (Schema)}: \quad \phi \implies \mathbf{S}(\phi)$$
A2 (Axiom Schema of Framework Internality) Main Text, Sec. 1, pp. 16–17 [JA ed.: Ch. 1, pp. 32–34]

Any framework of convenience $F(\phi)$, including “objective facts” and “matter”, does not lie outside sō-omou, but is established as an operation $\mathbf{S}(\phi)$ of sō-omou.

A2 (Schema) :  F(φ) ⇒ 𝐒(φ)
[Reading] For any formula $\phi$, if it is a framework of convenience $F(\phi)$, it is established as an internal operation of sō-omou $\mathbf{S}(\phi)$. (* A2 is not used in the derivations of T1–T8; it is an axiom for situating “convenience” within the formal system.)
[LaTeX] $$\text{A2 (Schema)}: \quad F(\phi) \implies \mathbf{S}(\phi)$$
A3 ([Meta-Theoretic Restriction] Meta-Rule on Autonomous Systems and Multiple Explanations) Main Text, Sec. 1, p. 17 & Appendix [JA ed.: Ch. 1, p. 34]

[Clarification of Status] Item A3 is not an axiom (formula) written inside the object language $\mathcal{L}$, but a meta-theoretic restriction when referring to or verifying this formal system from the outside. Accordingly, it adds no undefined predicates or sorts to the object language $\mathcal{L}$.

(1) The meanings of the internal symbols of this formal system ($B, S, PE, Loc$, etc.) are determined by the definitions, axioms, and [Readings] in this document. Inferences that substitute definitions of the same words from different external philosophical or scientific systems do not constitute a verification of this system, but rather inferences about a different system.
(2) Multiple explanatory models that each close consistently upon different axiom systems can coexist independently in the meta-theory (“as long as it works as an explanation, there may be any number of answers”).
A4 (Axiom of Symmetry of Mutual Establishment) Main Text, Sec. 4, p. 19 & Sec. 5, p. 20 [JA ed.: Ch. 4, p. 42 & Ch. 5, pp. 45–47]

“The act of picturing an object” and “the act of being pictured by that object” are fundamentally equal; there is no one-way relation of subordination between the side that acts and the side acted upon.

A4 :  ∀x ∀y  ( P(x, y) ⇔ P(y, x) )
[Reading] For all beings $x, y$, $x$ picturing $y$ and $y$ picturing $x$ are equivalent.
[LaTeX] $$\text{A4}: \quad \forall x \forall y \, (P(x, y) \iff P(y, x))$$
A5 (Axiom of Single Coordinate and Continuity) Main Text, Sec. 5, pp. 20–21 [JA ed.: Ch. 5, pp. 45–47]

Fundamentally, no chronology (sequence of distinct coordinates) exists. There is only one coordinate $c_0$, before-and-after relations hold only between distinct coordinates, and at $c_0$ there is the continuity $C(c_0, c_0)$ in which “the now keeps bringing about the now”.

A5 :  ∀c ( c = c₀ )  ∧  ∀c ∀c' ( Before(c, c') ⇒ c ≠ c' )  ∧  C(c₀, c₀)   (where c, c' are coordinate-sort variables)
[Reading] Every coordinate $c$ coincides with the single coordinate $c_0$. A before-and-after relation holds only between distinct coordinates. At the single coordinate $c_0$, non-temporal continuity $C(c_0, c_0)$ unfolds.
[LaTeX] $$\text{A5}: \quad \forall c \, (c = c_0) \land \forall c \, \forall c' \, (\text{Before}(c, c') \implies c \neq c') \land C(c_0, c_0) \quad (c, c' \text{ are coordinate-sort variables})$$
A6 (Axiom of Individual Constraint by Total Operation) Main Text, Sec. 5 [Supplementary Note], p. 21 [JA ed.: Ch. 5, p. 48]

$S_{\text{ind}}$ is an entity constant representing an individual’s personal sō-omou, and $y$ is a variable ranging over arbitrary beings. Because the personal sō-omou $S_{\text{ind}}$ and all beings $y$ are simultaneously co-present and operating at the single coordinate $c_0$, the world as a whole cannot be arbitrarily altered by a single individual’s sō-omou $S_{\text{ind}}$ alone.

A6 :  ( ∀y  CoPresent(Sind, y) ) ⇒ Limited(Sind)
[Reading] If an individual’s sō-omou $S_{\text{ind}}$ is co-present with all beings $y$ at the same coordinate $c_0$, then the individual’s leeway is constrained ($\text{Limited}(S_{\text{ind}})$).
[LaTeX] $$\text{A6}: \quad \left(\forall y \, \text{CoPresent}(S_{\text{ind}}, y)\right) \implies \text{Limited}(S_{\text{ind}})$$
A7 (Axiom of the Reality of Sō-omou) Main Text, Sec. 3, p. 19 & Final Sec., p. 22 [JA ed.: Ch. 3, p. 40 & Final Ch., p. 52]

Everything that is established as sō-omou is real.

A7 :  ∀x  ( S(x) ⇒ B(x) )
[Reading] If $x$ is sō-omou, then $x$ is real (exists).
[LaTeX] $$\text{A7}: \quad \forall x \, (S(x) \implies B(x))$$
A8 (Axiom Schema of Object Positing) Main Text, Sec. 2, p. 18 & Sec. 3, p. 19 [JA ed.: Ch. 2, pp. 37–38 & Ch. 3, p. 40]

Whatever proposition $\phi(x)$ about a being $x$ may be, if it is posited and appears as sō-omou $\mathbf{S}(\phi(x))$, then that being $x$ is established as sō-omou $S(x)$.

A8 (Schema) :  ∀x  ( 𝐒(φ(x)) ⇒ S(x) )   (where φ(x) is any formula containing x as a free variable)
[Reading] For any being $x$, if any proposition $\phi(x)$ is posited within sō-omou, then $x$ is established as sō-omou $S(x)$.
(* Combined with A1, A8 has a strong consequence. Since something holds of every being $x$ [for instance, $x = x$], by A1 it also holds as sō-omou $\mathbf{S}$, and by A8 $x$ is sō-omou. Consequently, every being in the domain is sō-omou [$\forall x \, S(x)$] and, by A7, is real [$\forall x \, B(x)$]. The thesis of Section 3 of the book, “every being is sō-omou itself”, enters the formal system in the form of these premises.)
[LaTeX] $$\text{A8 (Schema)}: \quad \forall x \, (\mathbf{S}(\phi(x)) \implies S(x)) \quad (\phi(x) \text{ is any formula containing } x \text{ as a free variable})$$

IV. Derivations of Theorems (Lemma L1, Theorems T1–T8)

From Definitions D1–D5 and Axioms A1, A2, A4–A8 alone, without relying on natural-language supplementation, each theorem is derived without omission using only standard rules of inference of first-order predicate logic (Modus Ponens MP, introduction and elimination of conjunction, implication, and biconditional, proof by contradiction [reductio ad absurdum], contraposition, double negation elimination, transitivity, universal instantiation and generalisation, existential instantiation, quantifier negation exchange, reflexivity/symmetry/transitivity and substitution of equality, and expansion of definitions). (* The derivations are written out by hand, and every step can be verified directly by the inference rules listed above. They have also been checked mechanically with the proof assistant Lean 4 (see “Machine Verification in Lean 4” in Section 0).)

[Lemma]
L1 (Every Being Is Located at One and the Same Coordinate Point — Main Text, Sec. 5, p. 21 / JA p. 47) Basis: Axiom A5 (First Conjunct)
⊢  ∀x  ( Loc(x) = c₀ )
[LaTeX] $$\vdash \forall x \, (Loc(x) = c_0)$$
[Derivation]
  1. Take an arbitrary being $x$. $Loc(x)$ is a term of the coordinate sort.
  2. Instantiating the first conjunct of Axiom A5, $\forall c \, (c = c_0)$, with $c := Loc(x)$ yields $Loc(x) = c_0$.
  3. By universal generalisation, $\vdash \forall x \, (Loc(x) = c_0)$ is derived. $\blacksquare$
[Stage 1: Integration of Recognition and Existence (Sections 1–3)]
T1 (Self-Collapse of the External Reality Hypothesis) Basis: Combination of Axiom Schema A1 and Definition D2a (Proof by Contradiction)
⊢  ¬∃x  ( B(x) ∧ Ext原理的(x) )
[LaTeX] $$\vdash \neg \exists x \, (B(x) \land Ext_{\text{原理的}}(x))$$
[Derivation]
  1. Assume $\exists x \, (B(x) \land Ext_{\text{原理的}}(x))$ (assumption for proof by contradiction).
  2. By existential instantiation, for some entity $a$, we have $B(a) \land Ext_{\text{原理的}}(a)$.
  3. Applying conjunction elimination to Step 2 yields $B(a)$ and $Ext_{\text{原理的}}(a)$ respectively.
  4. In Axiom Schema A1 ($\phi \implies \mathbf{S}(\phi)$), setting $\phi := B(a)$ gives $B(a) \implies \mathbf{S}(B(a))$. From this and $B(a)$ in Step 3, MP yields $\mathbf{S}(B(a))$.
  5. Instantiating Definition D2a with $a$ and applying biconditional elimination gives $Ext_{\text{原理的}}(a) \implies \neg \mathbf{S}(B(a))$. From this and $Ext_{\text{原理的}}(a)$ in Step 3, MP yields $\neg \mathbf{S}(B(a))$.
  6. Combining Step 4 and Step 5 by conjunction introduction derives the explicit contradiction $\mathbf{S}(B(a)) \land \neg \mathbf{S}(B(a))$ ($\bot$).
  7. Therefore, by proof by contradiction (negation introduction), Assumption 1 is discharged and $\vdash \neg \exists x \, (B(x) \land Ext_{\text{原理的}}(x))$ is derived. $\blacksquare$
T2 (Sō-omou Existence Theorem — Central Proposition of Section 3) Basis: Axiom Schema A1, Definition D1, Axiom A7
⊢  ∀x  ( B(x) ⇔ S(x) )
[LaTeX] $$\vdash \forall x \, (B(x) \iff S(x))$$
[Derivation]
  1. Take an arbitrary being $x$. In Axiom Schema A1, setting $\phi := B(x)$ gives $B(x) \implies \mathbf{S}(B(x))$.
  2. By universal instantiation and biconditional elimination on Definition D1 ($\forall x \, (S(x) \iff \mathbf{S}(B(x)))$), we obtain $\mathbf{S}(B(x)) \implies S(x)$.
  3. Applying hypothetical syllogism (transitivity) to Step 1 and Step 2 yields $B(x) \implies S(x)$.
  4. The converse direction is given immediately by universal instantiation of Axiom A7 ($\forall x \, (S(x) \implies B(x))$): $S(x) \implies B(x)$.
  5. Applying biconditional introduction and universal generalisation to Step 3 and Step 4 derives $\vdash \forall x \, (B(x) \iff S(x))$. $\blacksquare$
[Stage 2: Equal Standing of Object and Image, and Individual Constraint (Sections 4–5)]
T3 (Fundamental Equality of All Beings and Derivation of Individual Constraint) Basis: Axiom A4, Definition D3, Theorem T2 (Corollary: Lemma L1, Definition D4a, Axiom A6)
⊢  ∀x  ( B(x) ⇔ PE(x) )   (Corollary: ⊢ Limited(Sind))
[LaTeX] $$\vdash \forall x \, (B(x) \iff PE(x)) \quad \left(\text{Corollary}: \vdash \text{Limited}(S_{\text{ind}})\right)$$
[Derivation]
  1. Take an arbitrary being $x$. By universal instantiation of Axiom A4 ($\forall x \forall y \, (P(x, y) \iff P(y, x))$), $\forall y \, (P(x, y) \iff P(y, x))$ holds.
  2. Because the second conjunct on the right-hand side of Definition D3 ($PE(x) \iff (S(x) \land \forall y \, (P(x, y) \iff P(y, x)))$) holds by Step 1, $S(x) \iff PE(x)$ follows.
  3. Applying transitivity of the biconditional to Theorem T2 ($B(x) \iff S(x)$) and Step 2, and universally generalising, derives $\vdash \forall x \, (B(x) \iff PE(x))$.
  4. [Derivation of Corollary $\vdash \text{Limited}(S_{\text{ind}})$]: Instantiating Lemma L1 with $S_{\text{ind}}$ and an arbitrary being $y$ yields $Loc(S_{\text{ind}}) = c_0 \land Loc(y) = c_0$. Applying Definition D4a ($x := S_{\text{ind}}$) gives $\text{CoPresent}(S_{\text{ind}}, y)$, and universally generalising over $y$ gives $\forall y \, \text{CoPresent}(S_{\text{ind}}, y)$. From this and Axiom A6, MP derives $\vdash \text{Limited}(S_{\text{ind}})$. $\blacksquare$
T4 (Negation of Unilateral Generation — Mutual Establishment) Basis: Combination of Axiom A4 and Definition D2b (Defining Gen as an Asymmetric Operation)
⊢  ∀x  ( ¬Gen(x) )
[LaTeX] $$\vdash \forall x \, (\neg Gen(x))$$
[Derivation]
  1. Take arbitrary beings $x, a$. By universal instantiation of Axiom A4, $P(a, x) \iff P(x, a)$.
  2. Biconditional elimination yields $P(a, x) \implies P(x, a)$. By the definition of implication and De Morgan’s laws, this is equivalent to $\neg (P(a, x) \land \neg P(x, a))$.
  3. Universally generalising Step 2 over $a$ and applying quantifier negation exchange yields $\neg \exists a \, (P(a, x) \land \neg P(x, a))$.
  4. Applying the contrapositive of Definition D2b ($Gen(x) \iff \exists a \, (P(a, x) \land \neg P(x, a))$) to Step 3 and universally generalising over $x$ derives $\vdash \forall x \, (\neg Gen(x))$. $\blacksquare$
[Stage 3: Neither Beginning Nor End, Negation of Nothingness, and Already-Present (Sections 5–6)]
T5 (Boundlessness at the Single Coordinate = Neither Beginning Nor End) Basis: Axiom A5, Lemma L1, and Definitions D2c, D2d
⊢  ∀x  ( ¬Begin(x) ∧ ¬End(x) )   (Corollary: ⊢ ¬Begin(World) ∧ ¬End(World))
[Meaning of Theorem] Because there is only the single coordinate $c_0$ and a before-and-after relation holds only between distinct coordinates, no being has a coordinate before its coordinate or a coordinate after its coordinate. Therefore, every being (including the world as a whole, $World$) has neither beginning nor end (Final Sec., EN p. 22 / JA p. 52: “This world has neither beginning nor end”).
[LaTeX] $$\vdash \forall x \, (\neg Begin(x) \land \neg End(x)) \quad \left(\text{Corollary}: \vdash \neg Begin(World) \land \neg End(World)\right)$$
[Derivation]
  1. Take an arbitrary being $x$ and assume $Begin(x)$ (assumption for proof by contradiction).
  2. By Definition D2c, $\exists c \, \text{Before}(c, Loc(x))$. By existential instantiation, for some coordinate $c_1$, we have $\text{Before}(c_1, Loc(x))$.
  3. Instantiating the first conjunct of Axiom A5, $\forall c \, (c = c_0)$, with $c := c_1$ gives $c_1 = c_0$. By Lemma L1, $Loc(x) = c_0$. Substitution of equality yields $\text{Before}(c_0, c_0)$.
  4. Instantiating the second conjunct of Axiom A5, $\forall c \, \forall c' \, (\text{Before}(c, c') \implies c \neq c')$, with $c := c_0, c' := c_0$ and applying MP with Step 3 yields $c_0 \neq c_0$. This contradicts the reflexivity of equality $c_0 = c_0$ ($\bot$).
  5. Hence by proof by contradiction, $\neg Begin(x)$. By an identical argument on Definition D2d, $\text{Before}(Loc(x), c_2)$ yields $\text{Before}(c_0, c_0)$ and a contradiction, giving $\neg End(x)$.
  6. By conjunction introduction and universal generalisation, $\vdash \forall x \, (\neg Begin(x) \land \neg End(x))$ is derived. Instantiating with the entity constant $World$ yields the corollary. $\blacksquare$
T6 (Negation of Absolute Nothingness — Section 6) Basis: Combination of Axiom Schemas A1, A8, Axiom A7, and Definition D2e (Proof by Contradiction)
⊢  ¬∃x  AbsoluteNothing(x)   (Corollary: ⊢ ∀x  B(x))
[Meaning of Theorem] If we assume that “absolute nothingness ($\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a)$)” holds of some being $a$, then by A1 it also holds (is posited) as sō-omou $\mathbf{S}$, from which A8 and A7 derive $B(a)$, colliding with D2e ($\neg B(a)$). Therefore, there is no being corresponding to absolute nothingness. As a corollary, every being in the domain is real.
[Correspondence with the Main Text and Limitations] The main text (EN p. 21 / JA p. 49) states: “there is no longer any need to admit even ‘a beginning’, let alone ‘nothingness’”. Formally, under the strong premises A1 and A8, this takes the form “there is no being corresponding to absolute nothingness” (the strength of this conclusion comes from A1 and A8; see the note to A8). In addition, because the classical first-order logic used by this system presupposes from the outset that the domain is non-empty (that something exists), the state of “nothing existing whatsoever” cannot be expressed in this system in the first place. What T6 shows is up to “no being in the domain is absolute nothingness”.
[LaTeX] $$\vdash \neg \exists x \, \text{AbsoluteNothing}(x) \quad \left(\text{Corollary}: \vdash \forall x \, B(x)\right)$$
[Derivation]
  1. Assume $\exists x \, \text{AbsoluteNothing}(x)$ (assumption for proof by contradiction) and, by existential instantiation, let $\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a)$ hold for some being $a$.
  2. In Axiom Schema A1, setting $\phi := \text{AbsoluteNothing}(a)$ gives $\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a) \implies \mathbf{S}(\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a))$. By Step 1 and MP, we obtain $\mathbf{S}(\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a))$.
  3. In Axiom Schema A8, setting $\phi(x) := \text{AbsoluteNothing}(x)$, instantiating with $a$, and applying MP to Step 2 yields $S(a)$.
  4. From Axiom A7 ($\forall x \, (S(x) \implies B(x))$) and Step 3, MP yields $B(a)$.
  5. On the other hand, applying Definition D2e to $\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a)$ in Step 1 yields $\neg B(a)$.
  6. Combining $B(a)$ from Step 4 and $\neg B(a)$ from Step 5 by conjunction introduction derives the explicit contradiction $B(a) \land \neg B(a)$ ($\bot$).
  7. Therefore, by proof by contradiction (negation introduction), $\vdash \neg \exists x \, \text{AbsoluteNothing}(x)$ is derived.
  8. [Derivation of Corollary $\vdash \forall x \, B(x)$]: For an arbitrary being $x$, T6 gives $\neg \text{AbsoluteNothing}(x)$. By the contrapositive of Definition D2e, $\neg \neg B(x)$, hence $B(x)$. Universal generalisation yields $\vdash \forall x \, B(x)$. $\blacksquare$
T7 (Theorem of the Already-Presence of All Concepts — Section 6) Basis: Corollary of T6, Theorem T3, Lemma L1, Theorem T4, Definition D4b
⊢  ∀x  ( Concept(x) ⇒ AlreadyPresent(x) )   (Corollary: ⊢ ∀x  AlreadyPresent(x))
[Meaning of Theorem] Every concept $x$ is already present at the single coordinate $c_0$ without unilateral generation (Main Text, EN p. 21 / JA p. 49: “every concept is already present”). As a corollary, every being, ourselves included, is already present (Final Sec., EN p. 22 / JA p. 52).
[LaTeX] $$\vdash \forall x \, (Concept(x) \implies \text{AlreadyPresent}(x)) \quad \left(\text{Corollary}: \vdash \forall x \, \text{AlreadyPresent}(x)\right)$$
[Derivation]
  1. Assume $Concept(x)$ for an arbitrary being $x$.
  2. By universal instantiation of the Corollary of T6 ($\forall x \, B(x)$), we obtain $B(x)$.
  3. From Theorem T3 ($B(x) \iff PE(x)$) and Step 2, MP yields $PE(x)$.
  4. By Lemma L1, we obtain $Loc(x) = c_0$.
  5. By universal instantiation of Theorem T4 ($\forall x \, \neg Gen(x)$), we obtain $\neg Gen(x)$.
  6. Combining Step 4, Step 3, and Step 5 by conjunction introduction yields $Loc(x) = c_0 \land PE(x) \land \neg Gen(x)$.
  7. Applying Definition D4b to Step 6 yields $\text{AlreadyPresent}(x)$. By implication introduction and universal generalisation, $\vdash \forall x \, (Concept(x) \implies \text{AlreadyPresent}(x))$ is derived.
  8. [Corollary]: Since Steps 2–7 do not use the assumption $Concept(x)$, $\text{AlreadyPresent}(x)$ holds for any arbitrary being $x$, and universal generalisation yields $\vdash \forall x \, \text{AlreadyPresent}(x)$. $\blacksquare$
[Stage 4: Unity of Existence and Meaning (Final Section)]
T8 (Affirmation of the World and Sufficiency of Meaning — Conclusion of the Final Section) Basis: Theorems T2, T3 and Definition D5b (Corollary 1: Corollary of T6; Corollary 2: Corollary 1, Lemma L1, Definition D4c)
⊢  ∀x  ( ( S(x) ⇔ B(x) ) ∧ ( B(x) ⇔ PE(x) ) ∧ ( PE(x) ⇔ M(x) ) )
(Corollary 1: ⊢ ∀x ( S(x) ∧ B(x) ∧ PE(x) ∧ M(x) )     Corollary 2: ⊢ ∀x ∀y  Same(x, y))
[Meaning of Theorem] For every being $x$, being sō-omou ($S$), existing ($B$), being a fundamental being ($PE$), and being meaning itself ($M$) are equivalent. Corollary 1: Every being is sō-omou, is real, is a fundamental being, and is meaning (Final Sec., EN p. 22 / JA pp. 52, 54). Corollary 2: All beings are fundamentally one and the same being (Main Text, EN p. 20 / JA p. 46). Note that Corollary 2 is not numerical identity ($x = y$); distinct beings can exist simultaneously as distinct real beings at one and the same coordinate point (see Model $\mathcal{M}$ in Section VI).
[LaTeX] $$\vdash \forall x \, \left((S(x) \iff B(x)) \land (B(x) \iff PE(x)) \land (PE(x) \iff M(x))\right)$$ $$\left(\text{Corollary 1}: \vdash \forall x \, (S(x) \land B(x) \land PE(x) \land M(x)) \qquad \text{Corollary 2}: \vdash \forall x \forall y \, \text{Same}(x, y)\right)$$
[Derivation]
  1. By Theorem T2, $\forall x \, (S(x) \iff B(x))$.
  2. By Theorem T3, $\forall x \, (B(x) \iff PE(x))$.
  3. By Definition D5b, $\forall x \, (B(x) \iff M(x))$. Combining this with Step 2 via symmetry and transitivity of the biconditional yields $\forall x \, (PE(x) \iff M(x))$.
  4. Combining Steps 1–3 by conjunction introduction and universally generalising derives T8.
  5. [Corollary 1]: From the Corollary of T6 ($\forall x \, B(x)$) and T8, $S(x)$, $PE(x)$, and $M(x)$ also hold for an arbitrary being $x$. Conjunction introduction and universal generalisation yield Corollary 1.
  6. [Corollary 2]: For arbitrary beings $x, y$, Corollary 1 gives $PE(x)$ and $PE(y)$, and Lemma L1 gives $Loc(x) = c_0 = Loc(y)$. Definition D4c yields $\text{Same}(x, y)$. Universal generalisation yields Corollary 2. $\blacksquare$

V. Overall Deductive Structure (Deductive Flow and Stage-by-Stage Basis)

[1. Symbolic Deductive Chain]

( A5 )  ⊢  L1
( A1, D2a )  ⊢  T1   /   ( A1, D1, A7 )  ⊢  T2
( T2, A4, D3 )  ⊢  T3   /   ( L1, D4a, A6 )  ⊢  Limited(Sind)   /   ( A4, D2b )  ⊢  T4
( A5, L1, D2c, D2d )  ⊢  T5   /   ( A1, A8, A7, D2e )  ⊢  T6, T6 Cor.   /   ( T6 Cor., T3, L1, T4, D4b )  ⊢  T7
( T2, T3, D5b )  ⊢  T8   /   ( T6 Cor., T8 )  ⊢  T8 Cor. 1   /   ( T8 Cor. 1, L1, D4c )  ⊢  T8 Cor. 2
(A2, D5a, and $C(c_0, c_0)$ in A5 are not used in the derivation of any theorem.)
[LaTeX] $$(\text{A5}) \vdash \text{L1}$$ $$(\text{A1}, \text{D2a}) \vdash \text{T1} \quad / \quad (\text{A1}, \text{D1}, \text{A7}) \vdash \text{T2}$$ $$(\text{T2}, \text{A4}, \text{D3}) \vdash \text{T3} \quad / \quad (\text{L1}, \text{D4a}, \text{A6}) \vdash \text{Limited}(S_{\text{ind}}) \quad / \quad (\text{A4}, \text{D2b}) \vdash \text{T4}$$ $$(\text{A5}, \text{L1}, \text{D2c}, \text{D2d}) \vdash \text{T5} \quad / \quad (\text{A1}, \text{A8}, \text{A7}, \text{D2e}) \vdash \text{T6}, \text{T6 Cor.} \quad / \quad (\text{T6 Cor.}, \text{T3}, \text{L1}, \text{T4}, \text{D4b}) \vdash \text{T7}$$ $$(\text{T2}, \text{T3}, \text{D5b}) \vdash \text{T8} \quad / \quad (\text{T6 Cor.}, \text{T8}) \vdash \text{T8 Cor. 1} \quad / \quad (\text{T8 Cor. 1}, \text{L1}, \text{D4c}) \vdash \text{T8 Cor. 2}$$

[2. Summary of Basis and Deductive Mechanism by Theorem]

Lemma / Theorem Direct Basis Logical Mechanism of Derivation and Established Consequence
L1 A5 Applies the first conjunct of A5, $\forall c \, (c = c_0)$, to the coordinate $Loc(x)$, deriving that every being is located at $c_0$.
T1 A1, D2a From $B(a) \implies \mathbf{S}(B(a))$ (A1) and $Ext_{\text{原理的}}(a) \implies \neg \mathbf{S}(B(a))$ (D2a), derives the contradiction $\mathbf{S}(B(a)) \land \neg \mathbf{S}(B(a))$ ($\bot$) under the assumption $B(a) \land Ext_{\text{原理的}}(a)$.
T2 A1, D1, A7 Obtains $B(x) \implies S(x)$ from A1 ($B(x) \implies \mathbf{S}(B(x))$) and D1, and $S(x) \implies B(x)$ from A7, deriving $\forall x (B(x) \iff S(x))$.
T3 A4, D3, T2
(Corollary: L1, D4a, A6)
$S(x) \iff PE(x)$ follows from A4 and D3 and combines with T2. Also derives $\text{Limited}(S_{\text{ind}})$ via L1, D4a, and A6.
T4 A4, D2b Combines D2b (defining $Gen$ as an asymmetric operation) with the symmetry axiom A4 to derive $\forall x (\neg Gen(x))$.
T5 A5, L1, D2c, D2d Because there is only the single coordinate $c_0$ and before-and-after relations hold only between distinct coordinates (A5), $\text{Before}(c_0, c_0)$ cannot hold, deriving $\neg Begin(x) \land \neg End(x)$.
T6 A1, A8, A7, D2e From the assumption $\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a)$, derives $B(a)$ via A1, A8, and A7, yielding a contradiction ($\bot$) with $\neg B(a)$ from D2e. Corollary: $\forall x \, B(x)$.
T7 Cor. of T6, T3, L1, T4, D4b From $B(x)$ (Cor. of T6), obtains $PE(x)$ (T3), $Loc(x) = c_0$ (L1), and $\neg Gen(x)$ (T4), deriving $\text{AlreadyPresent}(x)$ via D4b.
T8 T2, T3, D5b
(Cor. 1: Cor. of T6; Cor. 2: L1, D4c)
Conjoins T2 ($S \iff B$), T3 ($B \iff PE$), and D5b ($B \iff M$). Derives $\forall x (S \land B \land PE \land M)$ in Corollary 1 and $\forall x \forall y \, \text{Same}(x, y)$ in Corollary 2.

VI. Model-Theoretic Proof of Consistency (Model ℳ Satisfying All Definitions and Axioms)

Independently of the derivations in Section IV, this section demonstrates that there exists a model $\mathcal{M}$ that simultaneously makes all 19 formulas of the definitions (D1, D2a, D2b, D2c, D2d, D2e, D3, D4a, D4b, D4c, D5a, D5b) and axioms (A1, A2, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8) of the object language $\mathcal{L}$ true, thereby proving the consistency of the system. (* A3 is a meta-theoretic restriction and not a formula of the object language.)

[1. Definition of Structure ℳ]

  • Domain of Beings (Entities): $D_E = \{s, t, w\}$ ($s$: an individual’s personal sō-omou, $t$: another individual [the other], $w$: the world as a whole)
  • Domain of Coordinates: $D_C = \{k\}$
  • Interpretation of Constants: $I(S_{\text{ind}}) = s$, $I(World) = w$, $I(c_0) = k$
  • Interpretation of Function: $I(Loc)(s) = I(Loc)(t) = I(Loc)(w) = k$ (all three beings are located at the single coordinate point $k$)
  • 1-Place Predicates on Beings: The extensions of $S, B, PE, Concept, M, \text{AlreadyPresent}$ are the entire domain $D_E$. The extension of $\text{Limited}$ is $\{s, t\}$. The extensions of $Ext_{\text{原理的}}, Gen, Begin, End, \text{AbsoluteNothing}$ are the empty set $\varnothing$.
  • 2-Place Predicates on Beings: The extensions of $P, \text{CoPresent}, \text{Same}$ are $D_E \times D_E$ (true for all pairs).
  • 2-Place Predicates on Coordinates: The extension of $C$ is $\{(k, k)\}$, and the extension of $\text{Before}$ is the empty set $\varnothing$.
  • Sentential Operators: The valuation of $\mathbf{S}, F, Truth$ is defined as the truth-value identity mapping for any formula $\phi$: $$V_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathbf{S}(\phi)) = V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi), \quad V_{\mathcal{M}}(F(\phi)) = V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi), \quad V_{\mathcal{M}}(Truth(\phi)) = V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi)$$
  • Logical Connectives and Quantifiers: Follow standard Tarskian truth conditions (entity variables range over $D_E$, and coordinate variables range over $D_C$).

[2. Verification of All 19 Formulas of Definitions (D1–D5) and Axioms (A1, A2, A4–A8)]
(Below, $x, y$ are arbitrary elements of $D_E$)

No. Object-Language Formula (Definition / Axiom) Evaluation in Model ℳ
(1) D1 $\forall x \, (S(x) \iff \mathbf{S}(B(x)))$ LHS $S(x)$ is True. RHS $V_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathbf{S}(B(x))) = V_{\mathcal{M}}(B(x))$ is True. True.
(2) D2a $\forall x \, (Ext_{\text{原理的}}(x) \iff \neg \mathbf{S}(B(x)))$ LHS is False. RHS $\neg V_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathbf{S}(B(x))) = \neg\text{True} = \text{False}$. True.
(3) D2b $\forall x \, (Gen(x) \iff \exists a \, (P(a, x) \land \neg P(x, a)))$ LHS is False. Since $P$ is True for all pairs, no $a$ satisfies $P(a, x) \land \neg P(x, a)$, so RHS is False. True.
(4) D2c $\forall x \, (Begin(x) \iff \exists c \, \text{Before}(c, Loc(x)))$ LHS is False. Since $\text{Before}$ is empty, RHS is also False. True.
(5) D2d $\forall x \, (End(x) \iff \exists c \, \text{Before}(Loc(x), c))$ Likewise, both LHS and RHS are False. True.
(6) D2e $\forall x \, (\text{AbsoluteNothing}(x) \iff \neg B(x))$ LHS is False. RHS $\neg\text{True} = \text{False}$. True.
(7) D3 $\forall x \, (PE(x) \iff (S(x) \land \forall y \, (P(x, y) \iff P(y, x))))$ LHS is True. $S(x)$ is True and $P$ is symmetric, so RHS is also True. True.
(8) D4a $\forall x \forall y \, (\text{CoPresent}(x, y) \iff (Loc(x) = c_0 \land Loc(y) = c_0))$ LHS is True. $Loc(x) = k = I(c_0)$ and $Loc(y) = k$, so RHS is also True. True.
(9) D4b $\forall x \, (\text{AlreadyPresent}(x) \iff (Loc(x) = c_0 \land PE(x) \land \neg Gen(x)))$ LHS is True. RHS is $\text{True} \land \text{True} \land \neg\text{False} = \text{True}$. True.
(10) D4c $\forall x \forall y \, (\text{Same}(x, y) \iff (PE(x) \land PE(y) \land Loc(x) = Loc(y)))$ LHS is True. RHS is $\text{True} \land \text{True} \land \text{True}$ ($k = k$). True.
(11) D5a (Schema) $Truth(\phi) \iff \mathbf{S}(\phi)$ For any $\phi$, $V_{\mathcal{M}}(Truth(\phi)) = V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi) = V_{\mathcal{M}}(\mathbf{S}(\phi))$. Always True.
(12) D5b $\forall x \, (M(x) \iff B(x))$ Both LHS and RHS are True. True.
(13) A1 (Schema) $\phi \implies \mathbf{S}(\phi)$ For any $\phi$, $(V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi) \implies V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi))$. Always True.
(14) A2 (Schema) $F(\phi) \implies \mathbf{S}(\phi)$ For any $\phi$, $(V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi) \implies V_{\mathcal{M}}(\phi))$. Always True.
(15) A4 $\forall x \forall y \, (P(x, y) \iff P(y, x))$ Since $P$ is True for all pairs, it is symmetric. True.
(16) A5 $\forall c \, (c = c_0) \land \forall c \, \forall c' \, (\text{Before}(c, c') \implies c \neq c') \land C(c_0, c_0)$ Since $D_C = \{k\}$, the 1st conjunct is True. Since $\text{Before}$ is empty, the 2nd conjunct is True. $C(k, k)$ is True. True.
(17) A6 $(\forall y \, \text{CoPresent}(S_{\text{ind}}, y)) \implies \text{Limited}(S_{\text{ind}})$ Antecedent $\forall y \, \text{CoPresent}(s, y)$ is True, and consequent $\text{Limited}(s)$ is True. True.
(18) A7 $\forall x \, (S(x) \implies B(x))$ Both antecedent and consequent are True. True.
(19) A8 (Schema) $\forall x \, (\mathbf{S}(\phi(x)) \implies S(x))$ Since the consequent $S(x)$ is True for every $x$, it is True for any formula $\phi(x)$.

[3. Conclusion]

  1. Consistency: In structure $\mathcal{M}$, all 19 formulas of the definitions and axioms are true ($\mathcal{M} \models \text{D1–D5} \cup \{\text{A1, A2, A4–A8}\}$). Therefore, by the Soundness Theorem, no contradiction ($\psi \land \neg \psi$) can be derived from this system ($\text{D1–D5}, \text{A1, A2, A4–A8} \nvdash \bot$).
  2. Derivability: In Section IV, Lemma L1, Theorems T1–T8, and their corollaries were derived from the above definitions and axioms alone by standard rules of inference ($\text{D1–D5}, \text{A1, A2, A4–A8} \vdash \text{T1–T8}$).
  3. What This Model Shows: The individual $s$, the other $t$, and the world $w$, while being numerically distinct beings from one another, exist simultaneously at the single coordinate point $k$, are all fundamental beings on an equal footing, and are fundamentally identical ($\text{Same}$). All relations among beings ($P$, $\text{CoPresent}$, $\text{Same}$) are symmetric, with no hierarchy or subordination.

From the above, the present system is consistent, and T1–T8 are derived from its definitions and axioms. Note, however, that this does not show that the premises (axioms) themselves are true (see Section 0, “Two-Layer Structure of Proof”). $\blacksquare$

VII. Logical Responses to Anticipated External Criticisms and Questions (FAQ)

Q1. Does deriving “the object itself is sō-omou (T2)” from “whatever holds, holds as ‘thinking so’ (A1)” not conflate epistemology with ontology (circular reasoning)?

[Answer]
There is no circularity in the formal structure. T2 is derived from A1, D1, and A7, and no step uses the conclusion T2 as a premise. The claim connecting recognition and existence is stated explicitly on the side of the premises A1, A7, and A8, which correspond to what Section 3 of the book sets out as its “hypothesis” (the book verifies in Sections 4–6 that this hypothesis does not contradict questions of time and nothingness, and takes it as the conclusion in the Final Section). What T1 shows is that, under these premises, the assumption that “an independent domain of existence lies outside sō-omou (recognition)” cannot hold. Moreover, the claim that “the act of recognition” and “the object in itself (thing-in-itself)” must be separated itself rests on a different premise (Kantian or modern subject-object dualism). Furthermore, sō-omou in this book is not a “subjective mental image inside the brain (an illusion)”, but the principle of reality that includes objects (matter and body) and recognition on an equal footing (T3), so the reality of matter is in no way impaired.

Q2. Is it not an internal contradiction to hold that “the distinctions between subject and object or self and other are conveniences (D2) and are one at a single coordinate”, while arguing in the Preface and Final Section that “each person’s boundaries ought to be protected”?

[Answer]
There is no contradiction. “Being one at a single coordinate” means that there is only one coordinate (A5) and that all beings are fundamentally identical (D4c, Corollary 2 of T8); it does not mean that everything is numerically a single individual. The individual, the other, and the world can each exist simultaneously as distinct real beings at the same single coordinate point $c_0$ (Model $\mathcal{M}$ in Section VI is an example). A “convenience $F$” does not mean a “worthless illusion”, but a structural division by which the whole at the single coordinate $c_0$ is concretely established as human beings and individual worlds. And by T3 and T8, the individual world in which each person lives (the domain of joy and attachment shaped by conveniences) is also affirmed as a “fundamental being (reality)” on an equal footing with the laws of physics and the universe as a whole. Precisely because there is no hierarchy of superiority or inferiority among beings (one cannot negate a lower subjectivity from a higher objective truth), the act of trampling upon and negating another’s boundary by an external yardstick is logically unjustified.

Q3. Are Axiom A4 (symmetry of mutual establishment) and Definition D5b (existence = meaning) not independent premises (redefinitions) posited by the author rather than deduced results?

[Answer]
That is correct. In addition to A4 and D5b, A1, A7, and A8 connecting existence and sō-omou, as well as A5 on the single coordinate, are premises posited by this book. No system of mathematics or logic can generate theorems out of nothing; every system sets down “axioms” and “definitions” that determine its character as its starting point. Whereas conventional philosophy has tacitly adopted “the asymmetry of subject and object (dualism)” or “the separation of existence and meaning” as premises, this book selects “mutual establishment (A4)” and “existence = meaning (D5b)” as explicit premises and exhibits a system that closes without contradiction from them. What this data demonstrates is that the conclusions are derived without contradiction from these premises, not that the premises themselves are true.

Q4. If “every concept is already present (T7)”, how can the human experience of thinking up something new (novelty) be explained?

[Answer]
It “appears as though newly born” because human beings grasp phenomena through the frame of chronological convenience ($F_{\text{time}}$: the flow from past to future). At the fundamental coordinate $c_0$, there is no unilateral generation ($Gen$) (T4). Insofar as a relation of establishment holds between a concept $x$—which is included in the overall structure from the start—and a human being $a$, it is necessarily mutual establishment ($P(a, x) \iff P(x, a)$, A4), appearing within the continuity $C(c_0, c_0)$. This has the same structure as the position in mathematics that “new theorems are not invented, but rather theorems that were present in logical space from the start are discovered”.

Q5. Does Theorem T6 merely show that “nothingness as an object of thought” becomes a being, without ruling out the possibility of “absolute nothingness that is neither thought nor recognised”?

[Answer]
In this system, absolute nothingness is defined as non-reality (D2e), so “real absolute nothingness” cannot hold by definition. And “absolute nothingness that is neither thought nor recognised”—that is, an $a$ for which $\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a)$ holds while $\mathbf{S}(\text{AbsoluteNothing}(a))$ does not hold—is ruled out by A1 (whatever holds, also holds as “thinking so”). Furthermore, by T6, there is no being corresponding to absolute nothingness at all. Note, however, that because classical first-order logic used by this system presupposes from the outset that something exists (that the domain is non-empty), the state of “nothing existing whatsoever” cannot be expressed in this system in the first place. What T6 shows is up to “no being in the domain is absolute nothingness”, which corresponds to p. 21 of the English edition (p. 49 of the Japanese edition): “there is no longer any need to admit even ‘a beginning’, let alone ‘nothingness’”. Moreover, the strength of this conclusion rests on the premises A1 and A8.

Q6. If the individual, the world, and the coordinate are treated as distinct, does a hierarchy (superiority/subordination) not arise among beings?

[Answer]
No hierarchy arises. Being distinct means being numerically distinguished, which involves no hierarchical ordering. Hierarchy or subordination arises only when there is a relation that holds in one direction alone (subordination or unilateral generation); in this system, however, the relation of picturing is symmetric (A4), there is no unilateral generation (T4), co-presence is symmetric (D4a), all beings are fundamental beings and meanings on an equal footing (Corollary 1 of T8), and all beings are fundamentally identical (Corollary 2 of T8). A coordinate is not one of the beings but a distinct sort representing the location of beings, so there is no hierarchy between coordinates and beings either. While being fundamentally identical, distinct real beings can exist simultaneously at one and the same coordinate point (Model $\mathcal{M}$ in Section VI)—this is the world depicted by the present system.